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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine what determines a state’s level of compli-
ance with the United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). While there 
have been several studies on what causes human trafficking, and some analysis of the 
US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, there is a remaining gap in the 
literature which this study seeks to fill. Those that do look at the TIP Report recognize 
a correlation between perceived level of corruption and TIP rankings (Lyday, 2000). 
However there are several cases to which this hypothesis does not apply, three of 
which will be examined here. These three states have relatively high levels of per-
ceived corruption, yet were still ranked as Tier 1, which represents countries with 
the highest level of compliance, in the 2010 TIP report (Transparency International, 
2010; US State Department, 2010). Therefore other factors will be proposed that could 
determine a state’s level of compliance in the prevention of human trafficking, as 
these cases do not support the aforementioned hypothesis. While these cases may 
simply be outliers to this theory, there indeed could be another reason that each of 
these countries were granted the highest level of compliance ranking, in spite of the 
corruption that hinders compliance.
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This paper will explore three case studies of countries that received a Tier 1 ranking 
in the Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria, Colombia, and Georgia. Tier 1 indi-
cates the highest level of compliance (out of three tiers) and is where most liberal 
democracies rank, including the United States. It is important to note that the TIP 
Report makes a clear connection between the level of both corruption in domestic 
governance and civil liberties in a country and the level of compliance with the TV-
PA’s minimum standards (US Congress, 2010). This, therefore, leads to a test of two 
our primary hypotheses: 1. A state’s level of corruption is negatively correlated with 
TVPA compliance; 2. Greater protection of civil liberties is positively correlated with 
TVPA compliance. For the purposes of this study, Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index and Freedom House’s Freedom of Civil Liberties Score 
will be used to examine perceived corruption and freedom of civil liberties, respec-
tively, in each case. It is not expected that the results of this study will support these 
hypotheses. Instead, the following examination of the cases of Nigeria, Colombia, 
and Georgia are expected to generate alternative hypotheses.
Nigeria is indeed a regional power in West Africa as the most populous country on 
the continent and the seventh most populous in the world (Odueme, 2011). It is also 
one of the world’s largest oil producers but, while the country’s rich oil reserves are 
lucrative and have potential to benefit the economy, any progress has been under-
mined by corruption and mismanagement. Instead, stolen oil has fueled violence and 
corruption in the Niger delta, which is home to the industry (BBC, 2010). The CPI 
ranges from 0-10 (10 being the least corrupt), and Nigeria has received a low ranking 
since the study’s beginning in 2001. The state climbed from a 1.0 on the CPI in 2001 
and peaked in the year 2008 at a poor score of 2.7 (Transparency International, 2010). 
Nigeria received a Tier 1 ranking for the first time in the TIP’s history in 2009, and 
again in 2010, and its CPI score decreased from 2.5 to 2.4, meaning the perceived level 
of corruption increased, in that same timeframe (US Congress, 2010 and Transpar-
ency International, 2010).  
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Osita Agbu, who studied corruption and human trafficking specifically in Nigeria, 
writes: “It seems Nigeria’s laws cannot effectively control corruption for the simple 
reason that they were not designed for the kind of society existing now,” and notes 
Nigeria’s inadequate enforcement agencies (“Corruption and Human Trafficking: 
The Nigerian Case”, 9). Agbu also recognized that the Nigerian government was not 
enforcing the legal framework created to combat corruption (2003). Nigeria’s prob-
lems with corruption have only worsened since (Transparency International, 2010). 
As previously mentioned, the level of civil liberties in a country was also suggested 
in the TIP Report as a possible link to the level of compliance (US Congress, 2010). Ni-
geria’s level of civil liberties, according to Freedom House, has remained at a slightly 
below average score of 4 since the analysis began in 2002. The civil liberties scale 
ranges from 1-7, with the lower score meaning more civil liberties.  The average civil 
liberties score of all of the other Tier 1 countries is a strong 1.2 (Freedom House, 2010). 
If strong civil liberties and limited corruption lead to greater compliance with the 
TVPA, as posited by the TIP report, then this case is puzzling (US State Department, 
2010). 
Table 1. This table shows the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores, Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” civil liber-
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Colombia has received a Tier 1 ranking in the Trafficking in Persons Report since 
the Report was first published in the year 2000 (US Congress). As the fourth larg-
est country in South America, with one of the largest populations on the continent, 
and the fourth largest economy in Latin America, Colombia is a powerful country in 
relation to other states in the region (BBC, 2010; Stokes, 2005).  The country is also 
the home of substantial oil reserves as well as precious metals. However, Colombia 
has suffered from decades-long violent conflict involving drug cartels and human 
rights violations (BBC, 2010).  According to Human Rights Watch, the government 
participates in illegal surveillance of those who are suspect of opposing it, including 
human rights workers (2010). Additionally, paramilitaries were recently demobilized 
but many returned to crime, and the law enforcement failed to investigate most of 
these (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Under this framework, it is not surprising that the 
level of perceived corruption and civil liberties are poor. Corruption in the country 
has been high for years, peaking at a below average score of 4.0 in year 2005, and 
declining (perceived corruption increasing) in the years since (Transparency Interna-
tional, 2010). The state has now reached a poor corruption score of 3.5 (Transparency 
International, 2010). Colombia, like Nigeria, has remained at a below average, yet 
fairly steady, civil liberties score of 4, with a brief period of more freedom in civil lib-
erties from 2006 to 2008 when the country received a score of three (Freedom House, 
2010). Given Colombia’s mediocre at best corruption and civil liberties rankings, this 
case undermines the hypothesis that high levels of compliance with the TVPA are the 
result of protection of civil liberties and limited corruption. Something else must be 
explaining compliance. 
Georgia’s Tier 1 ranking is puzzling as well. Although currently holding the highest 
CPI score (that is, lowest level of perceived corruption) of the three cases with a 3.8, 
Georgia has suffered from very high levels of corruption over the past decade (Trans-
parency International, 2010). The state began the study in 2002 with a score of 2.4, but 
quickly fell to a 1.8 the next year (Transparency International, 2010). The perceived 
corruption was slightly yet steadily increasing each year, and achieved its highest 
(best) score yet in 2009 with a 4.1.  In 2010 Georgia’s corruption score fell again to a 3.8 
(Transparency International). Similar to Colombia, Georgia has remained at a fairly 
steady below average score of 4 on Freedom House’s measure of civil liberties, with 
a peak period from 2005 through 2007 when the country received a score of 3—still 
lower than most other countries that receive a Tier 1 TIP ranking (Freedom House, 
2010; US State Department, 2010). It then declined to a score of 4 on the Freedom 
House scale in 2010. Again, Georgia is a case with mediocre levels of civil liberties 
and corruption; yet perfect compliance on preventing human trafficking.







What then, has led these countries to receive such a prestigious ranking in the U.S. 
Trafficking in Persons Report? It seems that following such guidelines outlined in 
the TVPA would be very difficult, if not nearly impossible, with the levels of corrup-
tion with which these three countries struggle. Transparency International defines 
corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (2010). It is surprising 
that a state with high corruption can rank so high in terms of human trafficking com-
pliance. It is also feasible that corrupt officials may not only allow, but profit from, 
human trafficking by being compensated by traffickers for ignoring the crime. Alter-
natively, some possible factors that may explain what contributes to a state’s level of 
compliance with the TVPA are suggested here.
Gender inequality could potentially contribute to the level of compliance with the 
TVPA; it is feasible that an inferior role of women in society could have an effect on 
the amount of trafficking in women that takes place, and, more importantly for our 
study, on the motivation a government may have to take the measures to prevent 
the trafficking.  The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act highlights the 
connection between gender inequality and the existence of human trafficking, and 
claims that “the low status of women in many parts of the world has contributed 
to a burgeoning of the trafficking industry.” (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 
2000, 1466) Although most victims of human trafficking are women and children, it 
must be noted that young men are also trafficked for agricultural labor, the sex trade, 
and by rebel armies for war within conflict-ridden countries (Lyday, 2000). Thus it is 
possible that the gender inequality could contribute to more trafficking in women, 
and then perhaps contribute to a less motivated government to stop this trafficking, 
but this factor does not explain a lack of compliance in fighting trafficking in males. 
Therefore, whatever effect gender inequality has on compliance with the TVPA seems 
to only apply to a fraction of the problem; that is, the governments that would lose 
motivation because of the inferior role of women. Theoretically these prevention stan-
dards should still be met to eliminate trafficking in males, but this is not the case and 
therefore this undermines the hypothesis that gender inequality is a primary driver 
of lack of compliance.
The level and accessibility of education in a society could also contribute to the level 
of compliance with the standards set by the TVPA. In a society that is more educated 
and has more access to education, it would be easier to make citizens aware of the 
problem and of ways to avoid becoming human trafficking victims. Lyday acknowl-
edges that public enlightenment through schools and other institutions is one way of 
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combating trafficking, and promoting awareness is one element which the TVPA 
takes into consideration in ranking states (Lyday 2000; US State Department, 2010). 
Thus an advanced educational system would provide the means with which the gov-
ernment could educate their citizens on this issue, and consequently make it easier 
for states to meet TIP standards for efforts to promote awareness. According to the 
Human Development Index, which includes records of the gross enrollment ratio in 
education at all levels, Colombia and Georgia both have fairly high enrollment ratios 
of 79% and 76.7%, respectively (United Nations Development Program, 2010). Nige-
ria, however, has a low level of enrollment at only 53% (United Nations Development 
Program, 2010). This makes level of education seem like a possible, yet questionable, 
contributor to level of compliance.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS DRIVE COMPLIANCE
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) seems the most credible contributor to compliance 
with the TVPA. FDI from the United States or other United Nations Security Council 
members could indeed contribute to a state’s level of compliance, as the incentive of 
receiving FDI could certainly persuade a country to comply with the standards es-
tablished (Fredette, 2009).  In fact, Kalen Fredette, in her study of the legislation of the 
UN Palermo Protocol (part of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime), emphasizes 
that compliance is “best achieved by orchestrating economic incentive and sanction 
programs among Protocol Members” (“Revisiting the UN Protocol on Human Traf-
ficking: Striking Balances For More Effective Legislation”, 133).  FDI certainly seems 
like it could explain these three states’ high level of compliance, as they are all major 
recipients of FDI, particularly from the US, yet they theoretically are risky candidates 
for investment. 
BBC describes Nigeria as “keen to attract foreign investment but [it] is hindered in 
this quest by security concerns as well as by shaky infrastructure troubled by power 
cuts” (2010). This statement shows how its compliance with the TVPA could be Ni-
geria’s attempt to be seen as a stable and strategically sound investment for donor 
states. A strong leader in the African Union (AU), Nigeria is a part of the New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development (NePAD), which the AU oversees. NePAD is an 
“anti-poverty blueprint which bargains with the West”, meaning promotion of good 
political and economic practice is exchanged for more foreign aid and investment 
(BBC, 2010).  Perhaps Nigeria’s compliance with the TVPA is one of their efforts of 
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It is feasible that Colombia, too, has deterred investors, as it is now one of the most 
violent countries in the world and could therefore be considered a risky investment 
(BBC, 2010). However the US remains the most influential foreign actor in Colombia; 
in 2009 alone the US gave $663 million to the Colombian government, the bulk of 
which went to military and police aid (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Human Rights 
Watch notes that US pressure is probably the main factor that has led the government 
to establish a specialized group of prosecutors to investigate trade unionist killings, 
which shows that the Colombian government could also be making an effort to reach 
the TVPA standards for the sake of aid in the same manner (Human Rights Watch, 
2010). 
The United States has significant strategic interest in Georgia; it has invested heav-
ily in an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey (BBC, 2010). Both the 
US and the EU deepened their engagement and financial backing of Georgia in 2009 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010). This seems like a similar exchange as that of NePAD 
in Nigeria. The US and Georgia signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership in January 
of 2009 envisaging increased cooperation. As a part of a US $1 billion pledge to sup-
port Georgia’s recovery following the 2008 war, the US gave $53.3 million (including 
$20 million for good governance, civic participation, and election and media reform) 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010).  Therefore, it could be concluded that states comply 
with such standards as those set by the TVPA out of strategic interest due to potential 
gain from those in control of the ranking, in this case the US. This part of the theory 
describes recipient motivation.
US MOTIVATION IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT
In addition to the motivation described above, a causal link that goes both directions 
is suggested; that is, the inclusion of donor motivation. There has been debate over 
the motivation of the US in their TIP tier placement and enforcement. Hendrix notes 
how the US has seemingly dismissed some Tier 3 countries of the economic sanctions 
that should have been put in place according to the policies of the TVPA (Hendrix, 
2010). According to the TVPA, the worst ranked countries are subject to non-human-
itarian, non-trade related foreign assistance sanctions from the US (Hendrix, 2010). 
However, all unilateral economic sanctions by the US are subject to presidential waiv-
er “based on a finding that certain circumstances exist, such as improved human 
rights conditions, ‘extraordinary circumstances’, or simply finding that waiver is in 
the US national security interests” (Hendrix, 2010, 196). It is this last reason to waive 
sanctions that seems to leave the US State Department the space to dissent from the 
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of ways and contexts, and perhaps some liberties have been taken when it comes to 
choosing which countries will suffer from sanctions and which will not. It is in this 
context that the credibility of the ranking and enforcement of the TIP Report is called 
into question, and therein lies what I believe to be the stronger argument for why 
these three states received the rankings they did. 
Of the 14 countries ranked Tier 3 in 2008, only five of them were issued the sanctions 
stated in the TVPA (Hendrix, 2010). Hendrix explains: “critics say that instead of is-
suing blanket sanctions based on behavior, the US picks and chooses which countries 
to sanction, ignoring those that are strategically important to the US” (“Enforcing 
the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act in Emerging Markets: The Challenge of 
Affecting Change in India and China”, 196). The US is accused of targeting those 
states where sanctions are already in place, or where there is little economic or secu-
rity strategy involved (Hendrix, 2010). Additionally, according to Hendrix, there has 
been some debate over whether countries that should be given a Tier 3 ranking are 
placed instead in Tier 2 to fit US interests (2010). For example, India was placed on 
the Tier 2 Watch List in 2007, when it was argued that it should have received a Tier 
3 ranking (Hendrix, 2010). CNN reported that “there was a heated debate between 
former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and former Deputy Secretary of State John 
Negroponte in which Rice overruled Negroponte’s wish to place them on the Tier 3 
list due to ‘concern about alienating the Indian government.’”( “Enforcing the U.S. 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act in Emerging Markets: The Challenge of Affecting 
Change in India and China”, 196-197)
I argue that the same strategy is applied when the US is choosing how to rank coun-
tries of strategic interest. It is clear that this argument is not a new one; the TIP re-
port is not outside the realm of US strategy. The US could argue that these rankings 
are what they are for security reasons (refer back to the economic sanctions’ waiver 
description—all unilateral economic sanctions by the US are subject to presidential 
waiver “based on…simply finding that waiver is in the US national security inter-
ests”) (Hendrix, 2010, 196). Rodrigo Pardo Garcia-Pena recognizes that “even the 
United States finds itself conditioned by what other countries and other actors do 
beyond the confines of North America” (The Issue of Drug Traffic in Colombian-US 
Relations: Cooperation As An Imperative, 103). This exemplifies the need for the US 
to cooperate with other states for their own security purposes; that is, the US is a state 
with vulnerabilities just like less developed nations, therefore the US must find ways 
to maintain and/or achieve security with other states as the world becomes more and 
more connected and interdependent. Robert Keohane puts it simply when he defines 















THE UNITED STATES TRAFFICKING PROTECTION ACT AND STATES’ COMPLIANCE: AN ANALYSIS
GTTOWER.ORG | 28
matters which, by virtue of their global nature, require global treatment.” (Garcia-
Pena, 1995, 103)
Human Rights Watch explains some possible reasons for the exemption of Nigeria in 
meeting the standards set by the US: “Because of Nigeria’s role as a regional power, 
leading oil exporter, and major contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping 
missions, foreign governments—including the United States and the United King-
dom—have been reluctant to publicly criticize Nigeria’s poor human rights record.” 
(2010) Human Rights Watch’s Annual World Report also notes that Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton spoke out against the endemic corruption in the government of Ni-
geria, but was unwilling to publicly condemn serious abuses committed by Nigeria’s 
security forces (2010). And although foreign direct investment and aid is a large part 
of the cooperation between the West and Nigeria, in 2009 the UK provided £132 mil-
lion in aid (including security aid) without demanding accountability (Human Rights 
Watch, 2010). This demonstrates the West’s lack of rigor in their demand for good 
political practice. The same goes for Colombia and Georgia, in that the US has signifi-
cant strategic interest in both states, as explained above in discussing the proposed 
FDI theory. 
I would like to stress that Tier 1 countries are those that are in full compliance with the 
minimum standards of the TVPA (Hendrix, 2010). Tier 2 countries are those whose 
governments are making significant efforts to comply; the extent to which human 
trafficking is a problem is considered, as well as the extent of noncompliance, re-
sources and capabilities of the government (Hendrix, 2010). Given the circumstances I 
have explained regarding each country’s challenges in governance, these three states 
are cases that seem far too challenged in their capabilities to fully comply with the 
minimum standards stated in the TVPA. As recently as 2009, the Universal Periodic 
Review recommended that Nigeria “improve its legal framework…and reform the 
police and criminal justice sector” (Human Rights Watch, 2010). How can the TVPA 
standards be met without a sufficient, much less weak, police and criminal justice sec-
tor? The Palermo Protocol, while not the same as the TVPA but created with similar 
ideals, makes it very clear that the capacity to train government officials is crucial to 
the prevention (of trafficking), punishment (of perpetrators), and protection (of vic-
tims) needed in regards to human trafficking (2000). The corruption (and symptom-
atic lack of civil liberties) in all three cases undermines good governance—a strength 
that is clearly needed to fully enforce the required standards. 
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METHODOLOGY
The United States Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act was created 
in 2000, “to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery 
whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective 
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.” (Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Act, 2000, 1466). 
The U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) is used in this study 
to operationalize states’ levels of compliance with the TVPA. The TIP Report was 
first published in 2000 and examines state governments’ efforts to achieve compli-
ance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards for 
the elimination of human trafficking.  This is an analysis that is focused on the level 
of government action to combat the problem of human trafficking rather than on 
the size of the problem itself (US Congress, 2000). The minimum standards for the 
elimination of human trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act mentioned 
above consist of the following:
The United States Victims 
of Trafficking & Violence 
Protection Act
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These standards and this paper are both written using the TVPA’s definition of “severe 
forms of [human] trafficking” which is described as: 
 a.   “sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, 
       or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has 
       not attained 18 years of age; or,
 b.   the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a 
       person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion 
       for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt 
       bondage, or slavery.” (US Congress, 2000, 8)
Based on the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, each 
state evaluated is placed into one of four categories: Tier 1 (the highest ranking, meaning 
full compliance), Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch Level, and Tier 3 (US Congress, 2000).  The descrip-
tion of each category follows:
Additionally, the perceived corruption and freedom of civil liberties are measured to test 
the primary hypothesis in each of the three case studies. For the purposes of this study, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and Freedom House’s Civil 
Liberties Score were chosen to measure each factor, respectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, as expected, these three cases fail to prove the primary hypotheses. Ni-
geria, Colombia, and Georgia all have an increasing amount of perceived corruption 
and below average level of civil liberties (Transparency International, 2010) (Free-
dom House, 2010). Alternatively, we see in all three cases the possibility of economic 
interest overpowering the corruption and civil liberties “obstacles”—meaning a state 
may see compliance as important and relevant enough to their economic interest to 
prioritize this goal and meet the TVPA’s requirements in spite of evident challenges. 
Hendrix notes in her study of the enforcement of the TVPA in emerging markets, 
that those countries “that received…more foreign investment were more responsive 
to shame” (Hendrix, 2010, 201-202). She also recognizes that reputational harm is 
more effective if it affects the country’s risk ratings for investment purposes (Hen-
drix, 2010). It is probable these three countries have made an effort to meet the TVPA 
standards as a defensive and preventative measure, for fear of receiving a low tier 
ranking and consequently losing FDI. 
In addition to, or possibly in the place of, this motivation, US strategic interest from 
the other side—the “ranker”, as opposed to the “rankee”—is a factor in the process as 
well. Perhaps the US has potential to gain something from giving such states public 
praise; it is uncertain if the reward is in the form of security, possibly an economic 
agreement of some sort, or something altogether different. It is possible that these 
states are not actually in full compliance with the TVPA, but rather are making some 
effort worthy of such public praise as a TIP Tier 1 ranking (or perhaps no effort is 
being made at all, but the strategic interest is strong enough to award the state with 
the ranking regardless). 
SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH
An examination of a broader set of countries ranked in the Tier 1 category of the 
TIP Report is necessary. How many other cases suggest the theories proposed here? 
Perhaps the primary hypotheses put forth in this paper and in the TIP, that is, (1) that 
a state’s level of corruption is negatively correlated with TVPA compliance, and (2) 
that greater protection of civil liberties is positively correlated with TVPA compli-
ance, is not accurate for many of the Tier 1 countries; in which case the validity of the 
TIP Report should be strongly questioned and the development of a new system may 
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